SteadyPay

Oleg Mokinoff recognized a critical market gap in 2018: roughly 50% of the global workforce lacks fixed paychecks, creating chronic financial instability for gig workers, freelancers, and contractors. Rather than a traditional BNPL product, SteadyPay approached the problem differently—converting irregular income into a predictable salary equivalent. The insight was elegant: use open banking connections to automatically detect income volatility, advance shortfalls during lean months, and collect repayment during high-earning periods. All of this without charging interest, only a subscription fee, making it "Netflix for credit."

SteadyPay started development in 2018 while running two parallel workflows: building the MVP and securing regulatory approval from the UK's FCA. This dual-track approach was critical—the company worked directly with regulators through the sandbox program to establish the first regulatory framework for this novel product type. By early 2019, they launched closed beta with 100 test customers to validate the core product. The technology stack focused on open banking integrations (in the UK) and API connections elsewhere, combined with machine learning and automated underwriting to assess credit risk in real-time. On-boarding took just 2-3 minutes, with all verification, KYC, AML, and risk assessment automated through bank data.

The company's initial growth relied on direct digital marketing—Facebook and Google ads targeting gig economy workers with irregular income. By end of 2019, they had raised less than £1 million from friends, family, and founder bootstrapping, plus £1 million of equity and £1.5 million in debt (warehouse facility) to fund customer advances. This capital structure was intentional: SteadyPay needed a lending facility to deploy advances to customers while subscription revenue alone wouldn't support growth. They launched customer acquisition with CAC of approximately £40 per customer against £200+ annual lifetime value, a unit economy that worked immediately.

Facebook and Google ads proved highly effective for direct-to-consumer acquisition, allowing SteadyPay to build critical mass. By early 2020, the company scaled operations, reaching 4,000 customers by the end of 2021 generating ~£32,000/month. More impressively, they achieved breakeven profitability while growing, a rare feat in fintech. The real breakthrough came through B2B partnerships: once enough gig workers from a specific employer (e.g., ride-hailing, delivery platforms) were on the platform, approaching that employer to offer SteadyPay as an employee benefit became obvious. This "push-pull" strategy—using direct marketing to build critical mass within employer cohorts, then converting employers into distribution partners—began driving inquiries. Default rates stayed below 10%, though importantly, the company distinguished between technical default (missing repayment but still paying membership and owing debt) and total loss (non-recovery), with the latter closer to 3% through friendly collection and customer nurturing approaches. Bank visibility across connected accounts prevented duplicate borrowing from multiple platforms.

By the time of this interview, SteadyPay had reached 10,000 customers across tiered offerings, generating £83,000/month (~£996k ARR, or $1M USD ARR). The business had grown 2.5x in customer count and 2.6x in revenue year-over-year while remaining profitable. They closed a £5 million Series A in recent months, selling 10-20% of the company at a valuation approaching £25-30 million. The warehouse facility (originally £1 million) was fully deployed with ~£900k drawn, having been recycled more than twice over 2.5 years, generating ~£3 million in total advances. The effective interest rate earned (20.8%) minus facility cost (13-14%) provided a 6% spread on deployed capital—modest but critical for early-stage proof of concept. Management was actively refinancing the original facility and discussing larger capacity (£5M+) for the next phase, while exploring additional financing partners. The TAM was enormous: 20 million gig workers in the UK alone, 80 million in the US with income volatility, and potentially 70-80% of the entire workforce could benefit from at least one SteadyPay offering (income stability, credit building, overdraft protection). Oleg positioned the company's moat on three pillars: high regulatory barriers to entry in credit, internal underwriting and treasury expertise difficult to replicate, and reputational risk for employers who attempted to internalize the product (risking accusations of debt-bondage). Growth levers included expanding B2B partnerships with major gig platforms and scaling the warehouse facility as capital recycling improved.