← Back to browse

Siempo

by Andrew Murray DunnLaunched 2017-03via Failory
SaaSproduct-hunt-launchfreemiumexisting-tool-frustration
See all SaaS companies using product hunt launch
Growthproduct hunt launch
Pricingfreemium
The Spark

Andrew Murray Dunn and his co-founders Andreas Gala and Jorge Selva connected in 2014 over a shared frustration with smartphone addiction and constant digital distraction. Jorge had experienced the clarity of using a flip phone on business trips to South America, while Andreas felt corporate burnout after testing endless smartphones as a product manager at Yahoo. They began hacking on what would become Siempo—a humane smartphone interface designed to support mental health and wellbeing.

Building the First Version

The early team initially pursued a hardware approach, working with engineers and industrial designers on a flip phone competitor similar to The Light Phone. However, they quickly hit the steep barriers of manufacturing hardware from scratch. In summer 2016, Andrew and part-time CTO Mayank Saxena joined the team, and the group pivoted to a white-label Android device with a redesigned software interface focused on conscious user experience. They launched a Kickstarter in March 2017 and raised $50k in device sales with heavy press coverage, but discovered users perceived high switching costs for new hardware and wanted the software experience on their existing devices instead.

Acting on this feedback, Andrew and Mayank pursued the software path as a launcher/home screen application on Android. They brought on a product designer and released an Alpha in December 2017, followed by a Beta launch on the Google Play Store in March 2018. The timing felt perfect—TechCrunch featured them, broadcast TV covered the story, and they won awards with stellar ratings. The cultural moment around digital wellness was ripe.

Finding the First Customers

Their primary growth driver was PR and media coverage, which generated awareness and downloads organically. The Beta launch resonated strongly with audiences concerned about digital wellbeing, and they built a community of engaged early users. However, converting this attention into paid subscriptions proved challenging—the team kept the app free during Beta and never experimented with monetization, missing early revenue signals.

What Worked (and What Didn't)

What worked: exceptional product-market timing aligned with mainstream concern about smartphone addiction; strong earned media and industry recognition; a founding team deeply aligned on mission and values; strategic pivots based on user feedback; building a public benefit corporation structure reflecting their values.

What didn't work: the platform gap—being unable to build on iOS meant losing half the US market and most investor iPhones, creating perception risk; remote team structure with mixed full and part-time contributors diluted cohesion and execution; no experienced CEO leading the organization; massive time spent on fundraising with minimal results, especially after Apple and Google announced Screen Time and Digital Wellbeing features, which spooked investors who viewed the space as too early and too controlled by giants; overestimating how cultural interest would translate to investor appetite; insufficient user research and validation of core assumptions; overly complex feature set transferred from their original hardware vision rather than building simple, focused software; weak onboarding experience that caused high drop-off rates despite investment in the area.

Where They Are Now

After pausing operations in summer 2018, the team rebuilt with exceptional talent (ex-Apple, SpaceX, BCG engineers) and attempted to relaunch through equity crowdfunding (WeFunder) in 2019. Days before launch, roadblocks appeared. They delayed, then spent the summer exploring B2B models but never launched the campaign due to burnout and continued lack of resonance with investors. Despite leaving "no stone unturned" in seeking new leadership or acquisition partners, they made the difficult choice to dissolve Siempo in 2020. The digital wellness space, though culturally ascendant, remained too nascent and too constrained by platform giants for venture capital to embrace early entrants.

Why It Worked
  • Perfect cultural timing and media resonance proved insufficient without platform parity—being Android-only meant losing half the market and investor confidence when the space needed credibility.
  • Raising capital is a distinct skillset disconnected from product quality; spending disproportionate time on fundraising with minimal results signals misalignment between investor appetite and founder vision rather than startup merit.
  • Early-stage mission-driven startups competing against entrenched platforms (Apple/Google) face an impossible venture math unless they find defensible niches or different monetization models than the giants.
  • Free products during beta with "strong willingness to pay" signals require testing monetization early; the team's assumption that free-to-paid conversion would work never received market validation.
  • Complex product feature sets inherited from hardware thinking don't translate to software retention—simplicity and onboarding matter more than feature richness for new interface categories.
How to Replicate
  • 1.When pivoting from hardware to software based on user feedback, ruthlessly simplify the feature set to the core 3-5 features that solve the primary problem; test each addition's impact on retention before launching broadly.
  • 2.For products requiring behavior change (like app launchers), invest 50%+ of early development effort in onboarding flow and measuring first-week retention; use cohort analysis to identify where users drop and iterate relentlessly on that step.
  • 3.If building on a platform owned by giants (Apple/iOS, Google/Android), begin validating acquisition and monetization channels on the platform you control (Android) within first 3 months; don't wait for full feature parity to test unit economics.
  • 4.For mission-driven startups, test willingness to pay within first 6 months of beta—offer the product at a low price ($2-5/month) to a cohort and measure conversion rates; never assume future conversion of free users.
  • 5.For new behavior-change categories, focus founder time on community building (weekly cohort calls, user advisory boards) rather than PR campaigns; community creates defensibility and feedback loops that media attention cannot.

Similar Companies

247.ai

$25.0M/mo

247.ai, founded by PV Cannon in 2000, is an AI-powered customer service automation platform serving over 150 enterprise customers with $300M+ in ARR. The company raised only $20M from Sequoia (2003) and bootstrap, achieving 10% net profit margins while maintaining a 12-month CAC payback period and 100% net revenue retention. Despite a security breach setback around 2018, 247.ai has recovered and recently achieved 20% new revenue booking growth in their best quarter.

iCIMS

$13.3M/mo

iCIMS is a bootstrapped SaaS provider founded in 1999 that dominates the talent acquisition software market as the #2 player, serving 3,500 enterprise customers with an average monthly spend of $4,000. The company exited 2017 with $160M ARR and is targeting 25%+ annual growth while maintaining profitability, recently acquiring Text Recruit to expand into candidate messaging and recruitment advertising.

Zoom

$12.0M/mo

Zoom is a freemium SaaS video conferencing platform founded by Eric Yuan in July 2011 after he left Cisco to build a next-generation collaboration solution. The company has grown to 850,000+ paying customers across individual, SMB, and enterprise segments, generating over $12M in monthly recurring revenue with approximately 100% year-over-year growth. Rather than focusing on customer stickiness or aggressive growth targets, Zoom emphasizes customer happiness and organic word-of-mouth acquisition, which has proven highly effective in driving viral adoption.

Madwire

$10.0M/mo

Madwire is a comprehensive SaaS platform for small businesses (1-100 employees) that combines CRM, payments, invoicing, billing, e-commerce, and multi-channel marketing tools in a single platform. Founded in 2009, the company has grown to $120M ARR serving 20,000 customers with an average revenue per user of $500/month, while maintaining strong unit economics ($3,000-$4,000 CAC with 3-month payback) and recently turning profitable with a focus on reaching 15-20% EBITDA margins. The company is exploring an IPO within 12-18 months without having raised substantial capital beyond an initial $7.5M.

SwiftPage

$7.0M/mo

SwiftPage is a CRM and marketing automation platform founded in 2001 that targets small businesses. Under CEO John Oshel's leadership since 2012, the company scaled from 60,000 customers with $26.2M revenue in 2015 to 84,000 customers today with an estimated ARR of $36M+, maintaining 1.5% monthly logo churn and a 6-7 month payback period with a sub-$500 CAC.

Related Guides